The Contribution of Logic to Epistemic Injustice

While much has been said on the connection between dominant rationality standards and systemic oppression, the specific role of logic in supporting epistemic injustice has not received much explicit attention. In this paper I highlight several ways in which it is possible for logic - as a discipline, as a particular system and as a gloss for rational common sense - to be implicated in epistemic injustice. Concrete examples are given for testimonial, content-based, hermeneutical and contributory injustices. I conclude by elaborating on how the need to address these injustices affects the attitudes we should carry toward logic.

Automated summary

This paper discusses the specific role of logic in supporting epistemic injustice and presents several possible ways in which it could be implicated. Concrete examples of testimonial, content-based, hermeneutical, and contributory injustices are provided, highlighting the need to address these issues and reconsider our attitudes towards logic.