The effect of bank recapitalization policy on credit allocation, investment, and productivity: Evidence from a banking crisis in Japan

This paper examines the ramifications of government capital injections into financially distressed banks during the 1997 Japanese banking crisis. Using a dataset merging firm-level financial statements and bank balance sheets, we explore whether the capital injections primarily benefited high-productivity firms or were misallocated to struggling zombie firms. The results suggest that post-injection banks increased lending to high-productivity non-zombie and low-productivity zombie firms. The former aligns with conventional theories prioritizing high productivity firms for investment and productivity enhancement; the latter suggests credit misallocation toward struggling firms mainly for debt servicing. There is no evidence that these injections promoted investments among firms. The results indicate that zombie firms reduced investments, particularly in infrastructure. High productivity non-zombie firms did not exhibit a significant investment boost despite receiving more loans but displayed positive labor and total factor productivity growth, potentially driven by sales growth and increased advertisement expenses rather than employment and wage adjustments.

Automated summary

This paper examines the consequences of government capital injections into financially distressed banks during the 1997 Japanese banking crisis. The results suggest that the injections primarily benefited high-productivity firms and struggling zombie firms, with the former experiencing positive labor and total factor productivity growth. However, there is no evidence of these injections promoting investments among firms.