Hylemorphic animalism and conjoined twins

Animalism is the doctrine that you and I are animals. Like any substantive philosophical position, animalism faces objections. For example, imagine a case of conjoined twins, where there are two heads, but only one body, and where each head seems to have its own typically human and fully discrete mental life. It would be natural to assume that each of the twins is a thing like you and me-each twin is one of us. But it appears that each twin cannot be a distinct human animal, since it appears in this case that there is only one animal. So it appears that animalism renders the wrong verdict in this case. I present two responses to this worry, drawing on Aristotelian claims about the centrality of sensation to animals, and on an account of organism-hood from Maureen and Samuel Condic. I close by considering craniopagus parasiticus and cephalopagus, and show the Aristotelian response is effective in such cases as well.

Automated summary

Animalism is the belief that we are all animals, but it faces objections. For instance, conjoined twins present a challenge to animalism because it seems that there is only one animal instead of two. However, the Aristotelian perspective on sensation in animals and the explanation of organism-hood from Maureen and Samuel Condic provide responses to this concern, which are also effective in cases like craniopagus parasiticus and cephalopagus.