Critical and Pragmatic Naturalisms: Some Consequences of Direct Realism in John Dewey and Roy Wood Sellars

Some consequences of direct realism and William James's philosophy of mind are considered in terms of American naturalism as seen in the debate between John Dewey and Roy Wood Sellars. Sellars's critical realism and evolutionary naturalism is compared and contrasted with Dewey's pragmatic realism and emphatically evolutionary naturalism. Though these naturalisms are similar, there are significant differences between methodology, their critiques of James's reflex arc concept in his Principles of Psychology, and the mind-body problem. Sellars's critical realism and naturalism retains a priori commitments to fixed categories and concepts, whereas Dewey's emphatically evolutionary pragmatic naturalism is empirical and sees continuities where Sellars insists on discontinuities. One significant difference is Sellars's maintaining a place for introspection as methodologically appropriate and Dewey's' rejection of it. These differences are illustrated through Sellars's modification of the reflex arc to include an organic but interpretative step, and Dewey's radical criticism of approaches like James's and Sellars's as recapitulating the Cartesian dualism that such views intended to overcome. These differences are finally contrasted in Sellars's maintaining a privacy of mind by constraining it to the brain in a dual-aspect theory, while Dewey advocates mind as sociocultural, expanding mind into body and world.

Automated summary

This article explores the consequences of direct realism and William James's philosophy of mind in the context of American naturalism, focusing on the debate between John Dewey and Roy Wood Sellars. It compares Sellars's critical realism and evolutionary naturalism with Dewey's pragmatic realism and emphatically evolutionary naturalism, highlighting the differences in methodology, critique of James's reflex arc concept, and the mind-body problem. The article also discusses Sellars's retention of introspection as a methodologically appropriate approach and Dewey's rejection of it, with examples of their modifications to the reflex arc concept. Finally, the article contrasts Sellars's dual-aspect theory, which maintains a privacy of mind constrained to the brain, with Dewey's view of mind as sociocultural, expanding into the body and world.