期刊
ENERGY
卷 288, 期 -, 页码 -出版社
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2023.129694
关键词
CCUS; Coal-fired power plants; Incentive mechanism; Evolutionary game theory; Real options
This study explores incentive mechanisms to promote the development of Carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) projects in China's coal-fired power plants (CFPPs). The findings suggest that financial incentives, such as clean electricity price subsidy and initial investment subsidy, have different impacts on CFPPs, with the government preferentially implementing the latter. Non-financial incentives, such as extra electricity quota, have a larger impact on CCUS project development. The frequency and magnitude of policy and subsidy adjustments also affect the success of CCUS projects.
Carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) is a critical technology for reducing carbon emissions from coal-fired power plants (CFPPs). However, the CCUS project in China's CFPPs is not highly economically feasible, and the existing policies lack effective incentives. This study proposes an option-game approach to explore the incentive mechanisms to promote the CCUS project development in CFPPs, including initial investment subsidy, clean electricity price subsidy, incremental carbon emission allowance, and extra electricity quota. Based on the simulation results of a CCUS project in Guangdong Province, our major findings are as follows: 1) Of the two financial incentives, the clean electricity price subsidy has a better impact on CFPPs, but from a social welfare perspective, the government prefers to implement the initial investment subsidy. With a 0.045 yuan/kWh clean electricity price subsidy, the proportion of CFPPs choosing to invest in the CCUS project increases by 113.72 %. With an initial investment subsidy of 40 %, the proportion of governments choosing to incentivize the CCUS project investment decreases by only 6.08 %. 2) Non-financial incentive mechanisms have a larger impact on CCUS project development than financial incentives. And providing extra electricity quota can increase the proportion of government incentives for the CCUS project by up to 21.88 %. 3) The policy adjustment frequency and the subsidy adjustment magnitude have different levels of impact on the CCUS project.
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