Brand-Owners' Exclusive Channel Strategies in Multitier Supply Chains: Effect of Contract Unobservability

In multitier supply chains, brand-owners often form exclusive deals with downstream retailers or upstream suppliers. Therefore, the selection of exclusive channel strategies becomes a critical decision for brand owners, resulting in three typical structures: a flexible structure, an exclusive retailing-channel structure, and an exclusive purchasing-channel structure. This paper contributes to the literature by formulating these three representative channel structures in a three-tier supply chain. Both observable and unobservable contracts are considered in each structure. We build game-theoretical models and derive the equilibrium outcomes under observable and unobservable contracts. We find that the exclusive retailing channel is more beneficial for brand-owners, regardless of whether the contracts are observable or unobservable. Additionally, the exclusive retailing channel benefits the entire supply chain more than the exclusive purchasing channel when the level of channel substitutability is low (high) under contract observability (unobservability). With regard to the effect of contract unobservability, we find that it can benefit brand-owners when the level of channel substitutability is low, but it can harm them when the level of channel substitutability is high. Furthermore, we explore the effects of channel substitutability and demonstrate that brand-owners' performance can be positively and negatively affected by the channel substitutability under contract unobservability. Our findings provide operational strategies for brand-owners to form exclusive channels in a multitier supply chain.

Automated summary

In multitier supply chains, the selection of exclusive channel strategies becomes a critical decision for brand owners, resulting in three typical structures. This study formulates these structures in a three-tier supply chain and considers observable and unobservable contracts. It builds game-theoretical models and finds that the exclusive retailing channel is more beneficial for brand-owners, regardless of the contract observability. The level of channel substitutability and contract unobservability also have significant effects on brand owners' performance.