4.6 Article

Small bots, big impact: solving the conundrum of cooperation in optional Prisoner's Dilemma game through simple strategies

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ROYAL SOC
DOI: 10.1098/rsif.2023.0301

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evolutionary game theory; simple bots; optional Prisoner's Dilemma game; cooperation

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Cooperative bots facilitate the emergence of cooperation among ordinary players in both well-mixed populations and a regular lattice. Introducing loner bots has different effects depending on the imitation scenarios, with facilitation in regular lattices under strong imitation scenarios but inhibition on the spread of cooperation when too many loner bots are present. The findings highlight the significance of bot design in promoting cooperation in real-world scenarios.
Cooperation plays a crucial role in both nature and human society, and the conundrum of cooperation attracts the attention from interdisciplinary research. In this study, we investigated the evolution of cooperation in optional Prisoner's Dilemma games by introducing simple bots. We focused on one-shot and anonymous games, where the bots could be programmed to always cooperate, always defect, never participate or choose each action with equal probability. Our results show that cooperative bots facilitate the emergence of cooperation among ordinary players in both well-mixed populations and a regular lattice under weak imitation scenarios. Introducing loner bots has no impact on the emergence of cooperation in well-mixed populations, but it facilitates the dominance of cooperation in regular lattices under strong imitation scenarios. However, too many loner bots on a regular lattice inhibit the spread of cooperation and can eventually result in a breakdown of cooperation. Our findings emphasize the significance of bot design in promoting cooperation and offer useful insights for encouraging cooperation in real-world scenarios.

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