A Secure Two-Party Euclidean Distance Computation Scheme Through a Covert Adversarial Model Based on Paillier Encryption

Existing secure two-party Euclidean distance computation schemes are mostly performed based on a semi-honest model, which faces bottlenecks in computation efficiency and security. In view of this, this study proposed a secure two-party euclidean distance computation (SEDC) scheme under a covert adversarial model based on Paillier encryption. In the scheme, the secure two-party Euclidean distance was computed by using technologies, such as Paillier encryption, and the computation results were verified with each other to ensure that both parties sent real data and had no cheating in the process of parameter interaction. Through verification, the scheme is correct, confidential and unforgeable under chosen-plaintext attack. Scheme comparison and efficiency analysis show that the scheme achieves a balance in the security model, which not only has relatively high security, but also is more in line with the value of Euclidean distance computation in practice. In the meanwhile, this ensures the slight communication complexity and time complexity in the computation of the scheme and enables the scheme to be of high application prospect.

Automated summary

This study proposes a secure two-party euclidean distance computation (SEDC) scheme based on Paillier encryption under a covert adversarial model. The scheme computes the secure two-party Euclidean distance using technologies such as Paillier encryption, and verifies the computation results to ensure data authenticity and no cheating during parameter interaction. The scheme is shown to be correct, confidential, and unforgeable under chosen-plaintext attack. Scheme comparison and efficiency analysis demonstrate that the scheme achieves a balance in the security model and is highly applicable due to its low communication and time complexity.