期刊
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
卷 104, 期 -, 页码 23-41出版社
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.peva.2016.07.001
关键词
Bitcoin; Blockchain; Block hiding strategies; Honest mining; Selfish-mine
资金
- Research Foundation of South Africa [83965]
- Telkom SA Limited
- Australian Research Council [FL130100039]
- ARC Centre of Excellence for Mathematical and Statistical Frontiers (ACEMS) [CE140100049]
- Australian Research Council [FL130100039] Funding Source: Australian Research Council
In the context of the 'selfish-mine' strategy proposed by Eyal and Sirer, we study the effect of communication delay on the evolution of the Bitcoin blockchain. First, we use a simplified Markov model that tracks the contrasting states of belief about the blockchain of a small pool of dishonest miners and the 'rest of the community' to establish that the use of block-hiding strategies, such as selfish-mine, causes the rate of production of orphan blocks to increase. Then we use a spatial Poisson process model to study values of Eyal and Sirer's parameter gamma, which denotes the proportion of the honest community that mines on a previously-secret block released by the pool in response to the mining of a block by the honest community. Finally, we use discrete-event simulation to study the behaviour of a network of Bitcoin miners, a proportion of which is colluding in using the selfish-mine strategy, under the assumption that there is a delay in the communication of information between miners. The models indicate that both the dishonest and the honest miners were worse off than they would have been if no dishonest mining were present, and that it is possible for the mining community to detect block-hiding behaviour, such as that used in selfish-mine, by monitoring the rate of production of orphan blocks. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据