期刊
OMEGA-INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
卷 59, 期 -, 页码 228-237出版社
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.omega.2015.06.010
关键词
Airline alliances network revenue; management; Code sharing; Horizontal/vertical competition; Pure nash equilibrium
资金
- German Research Foundation (DFG) [KI 1272/2-2]
We present a model to optimize a competitor's behavior in a network revenue management game within an airline alliance. In particular, we model two forms of competition; horizontal competition with parallel substitutable flights and vertical competition with both competitors operating adjacent connecting flights in a code sharing agreement. We compute pure Nash equilibria with an iterative algorithm presented in an earlier paper. A computational study shows that the algorithm is also suited for computing Nash equilibria taking both types of competition into account and that code sharing increases revenues for both competitors. However, the difference decreases as the network size and mean demand increase. (c) 2015 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据