期刊
GAMES
卷 14, 期 4, 页码 -出版社
MDPI
DOI: 10.3390/g14040055
关键词
asymmetric reimbursement; contingent fee; inefficiency; fairness; Tullock-type contests; unobservable and observable contracts
We examine how the observability of contracts between a plaintiff and attorney affects the efficiency and fairness of environmental conflicts. Using two game-theoretic models (an observable-contract game and an unobservable-contract game), we find two main results: (i) Unobservability of a contract may lead to inefficiency in legal efforts during environmental conflicts; however, (ii) Unobservability of a contract may increase the fairness of the outcome, specifically the plaintiff's probability of winning.
We investigate the impact of observability of contracts between a plaintiff and his attorney on both the efficiency of the environmental conflict and the fairness of the resulting outcome from the environmental conflict. By including two specific game-theoretic models (an observable-contract game and an unobservable-contract game), we find two key results: (i) The unobservability of a contract may increase inefficiency of the environmental conflict in terms of legal efforts; however, (ii) the unobservability of a contract may increase the fairness of the outcome in terms of the plaintiff's probability of winning the contest.
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