4.7 Article

Price matching and product differentiation strategies considering showrooming

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ELSEVIER SCI LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.jretconser.2023.103473

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Showrooming; Price matching; Product differentiation; Channel competition; Game theory

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Showrooming is a threat to traditional retailers, where customers assess products in stores but buy them from online retailers at lower prices. To combat this, many retailers have implemented price matching. In response, online retailers have started selling differentiated products to weaken the advantage of showrooming. A duopoly game is constructed to study the profitability of product differentiation and price matching, showing that differentiation benefits online retailers when their product is more popular, but can also be successful when their product is less popular if price matching is involved.
Showrooming, a phenomenon in which customers use brick-and-mortar stores to assess products and then purchase them from online retailers (o-retailers) for lower prices, is considered a great threat to traditional retailers (t-retailers). To combat showrooming, many t-retailers have executed price matching which enables customers to pay o-retailers' lower prices for the identical product. To avoid direct competition with t-retailers who execute price matching, many o-retailers have begun to sell differentiated products from t-retailers, which weakens the information advantage to customers from practicing showrooming. Motivated by these observations, we construct a duopoly game, where a t-retailer and an o-retailer sell products in a same category, to study the profitabilities of product differentiation and price matching in the context of showrooming. The results show that in the scenario without price matching, the o-retailer is likely to benefit from product differentiation only when the o-retailer's differentiated product is more popular with customers than the t-retailer's product. However, in the price matching scenario, the o-retailer also has the opportunity to benefit from product differentiation when the o-retailer's differentiated product is less popular with customers than the t-retailer's product, and product differentiation can be a win-win strategy for the two retailers under certain conditions. Considering the o-retailer's product differentiation decision, the t-retailer is only likely to execute price matching if the non-digital attributes of the product category sold by two retailers are not very obvious.

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