Does allowing for changes of mind influence initial responses?

Evidence accumulation models (EAMs) have become the dominant theoretical framework for rapid decision-making, and while many theoretically distinct variants exist, comparisons have proved challenging due to strong mimicry in their predictions about choice response time data. One solution to reduce mimicry is constraining these models with double responses, which are a second response that is made after the initial response. However, instructing participants that they are allowed to change their mind could influence their strategy for initial responding, meaning that explicit double responding paradigms may not generalise to standard paradigms. Here, we provide a validation of explicit double responding paradigms, by assessing whether participants' initial decisions - as measured by diffusion model parameters - differ based on whether or not they were instructed that they could change their response after their initial response. Across three experiments, our results consistently indicate that allowing for changes of mind does not influence initial responses, with Bayesian analyses providing at least moderate evidence in favour of the null in all cases. Our findings suggest that explicit double responding paradigms should generalise to standard paradigms, validating the use of explicit double responding in future rapid decision-making studies.

Automated summary

This study validates the use of explicit double responding paradigms by assessing whether initial decisions of participants differ based on whether they were instructed that they could change their response. The results consistently show that allowing for changes of mind does not influence initial responses, with Bayesian analyses providing at least moderate evidence in favor of the null hypothesis.