Zhuangzi and collaboration in animals: a critical conceptual analysis of shared intentionality

Shared intentionality is a specific form of shared agency where a group can be understood to have an intention. It has been conjectured that humans are better equipped for collaboration than other animals because humans but not other great apes share intentions. However, exporting shared intentionality from a debate about the ontology of mental state attributions like intentions to groups does not seamlessly lend itself to evolutionary science. To explore and de-center the implicit assumptions of Western conceptions of cooperation, I look at Zhuangzi's philosophy of (in)action. This philosophy treats the actions of individuals as always a form of co-action alongside other agencies to whom one must adapt. Thinking of collaboration as a product of skillful co-action, not shared intention, sidesteps asking about cooperation in kinds or levels. Instead, it directs attention to the know-how and behavioral flexibility needed to make our constant coordination adaptive.

Automated summary

Shared intentionality is a specific form of shared agency where a group can be understood to have an intention. Humans, unlike other great apes, share intentions, making them better equipped for collaboration. However, applying shared intentionality to groups in evolutionary science is challenging. To challenge Western conceptions of cooperation, Zhuangzi's philosophy of (in)action treats individual actions as a form of co-action and highlights the need for behavioral flexibility in constant coordination.