4.7 Article

Does Contract Length Matter? The Impact of Various Contract-Farming Regimes on Land-Improvement Investment and the Efficiency of Contract Farmers in Pakistan

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AGRICULTURE-BASEL
卷 13, 期 9, 页码 -

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MDPI
DOI: 10.3390/agriculture13091651

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contract-farming regimes; land-improvement investment; land-use policy; productivity; technical efficiency; organic farming

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Land-tenure security is crucial for socioeconomic development in local communities. This study examines the impact of different contract-farming regimes on land-improvement investment, productivity, and technical efficiency of farmers in Punjab, Pakistan. The findings suggest that long-term contracts lead to higher yields, income, and profit for farmers, as well as greater investment in land-improvement measures and improved technical efficiency.
Land-tenure security is integral to local communities' socioeconomic development. It has been a center of debate in academia and for legislators and advocates to implement reforms to enhance efficient and sustainable development in land management. Yet, knowledge gaps remain in how various contract-farming regimes contribute to land-improvement investment and technical efficiency. This study used a data set of 650 farm households collected through a two-stage stratified sampling to investigate the influence of three contract-farming regimes: long-term, medium-term, and short-term contracts, on the land-improvement investment, productivity, and technical efficiency of contract farmers in Punjab, Pakistan. The study used multivariate probit and ordinary least square regression models to examine the posit relationships. The findings highlight that farmers with long-term land contracts have higher per hectare yield, income and profit than those with medium-term and short-term contracts. The results confirm that farmers with medium- and long-term contracts tend to invest more in land-improvement measures, i.e., organic and green manure. Further, the study findings demonstrate that long-term land tenures are more effective when farmers make decisions regarding the on-farm infrastructure, like tube-well installation, tractor ownership, and holding farm logistics. Last, the study results confirm that long-term contracts are more robust regarding technical efficiency. Moreover, the findings support the Marshallian inefficiency hypothesis and extend the literature on contract farming, land-improvement investment, and land use policy, and offer coherent policy actions for stakeholders to improve farmers' productivity, technical efficiency, and income.

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