4.6 Article

Self-organization in Slovenian public spending

期刊

ROYAL SOCIETY OPEN SCIENCE
卷 10, 期 8, 页码 -

出版社

ROYAL SOC
DOI: 10.1098/rsos.221279

关键词

corruption; public spending; Slovenia; self-organization; power law; preferential attachment

向作者/读者索取更多资源

In Slovenia, private companies have received public funding from January 2003 to May 2020. The distribution of money among these companies follows certain patterns, with evidence of a first-mover advantage. The funding received by companies also shows a roughly linear trend over time, indicating the presence of self-organizing principles in Slovenian public spending.
Private businesses are often entrusted with public contracts, wherein public money is allocated to a private company. This process raises concerns about transparency, even in the most developed democracies. But are there any regularities guiding this process? Do all private companies benefit equally from the state budgets? Here, we tackle these questions focusing on the case of Slovenia, which keeps excellent records of this kind of public spending. We examine a dataset detailing every transfer of public money to the private sector from January 2003 to May 2020. During this time, Slovenia has conducted business with no less than 248 989 private companies. We find that the cumulative distribution of money received per company can be reasonably well explained by a power-law or lognormal fit. We also show evidence for the first-mover advantage, and determine that companies receive new funding in a way that is roughly linear over time. These results indicate that, despite all human factors involved, Slovenian public spending is at least to some extent regulated by emergent self-organizing principles.

作者

我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。

评论

主要评分

4.6
评分不足

次要评分

新颖性
-
重要性
-
科学严谨性
-
评价这篇论文

推荐

暂无数据
暂无数据