期刊
PHYSICA A-STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS
卷 630, 期 -, 页码 -出版社
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.physa.2023.129282
关键词
Social dilemma game; Cooperation; Migration; Punishment
Individual migration has often been overlooked in previous studies on altruistic punishment. This study explores the evolution of altruistic punishment in a mobile population and finds that migration prioritizing potential benefits contributes to population clustering and promotes the flourishing of altruistic punishment.
Altruistic punishment has been shown to sustain cooperation in social dilemmas. However, the influence of individual migration has often been overlooked in previous studies investigating the emergence of altruistic punishment. In this study, we address this gap by exploring the evolution of altruistic punishment in a mobile population. To capture the complexities of individual migration decisions, we propose a weighted migration model that incorporates individuals' as-sessments of potential gains and losses. Our findings reveal that migration prioritizing potential benefits contributes to population clustering, and such spatial self-organization patterns play a vital role in promoting the flourishing of altruistic punishment. Conversely, when individuals are more inclined to avoid losses, it intensifies the dissolution of cooperative clusters and inhibits the evolution of cooperation. Moreover, our results suggest that pro-social punishment can still be maintained during the migration process, even in scenarios with low punishment efficiency, as long as individuals are capable of imposing sufficiently large amounts of punishments. This study provides valuable insights into the emergence and maintenance of altruistic punishment.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据