4.4 Article

Dynamic control of pollution of municipal solid waste incineration

期刊

KYBERNETES
卷 -, 期 -, 页码 -

出版社

EMERALD GROUP PUBLISHING LTD
DOI: 10.1108/K-06-2023-1114

关键词

Waste incineration pollution control; Local government; Waste incineration plants; Government-enterprise collusion (GEC)

向作者/读者索取更多资源

The purpose of this study is to find strategies to enhance pollution oversight by local governments and reduce government-enterprise collusion levels. The study also investigates factors influencing pollution control efforts at incineration plants. The findings provide valuable insights for central governments worldwide on regulating waste incineration practices.
PurposeThe purpose of the study is to investigate strategies for enhancing pollution oversight by local governments while reducing government-enterprise collusion (GEC) levels. Additionally, the factors influencing pollution control efforts at incineration plants are explored. Potential approaches to improving them and for effectively reducing waste incineration pollution are suggested.Design/methodology/approachThe authors examined the most effective methods for mitigating incineration-related pollution and preventing collusion and developed a differential game model involving interactions between local governments and incineration plants. The findings of this work have significant policy implications for central governments worldwide seeking to regulate waste incineration practices.FindingsThe results indicate that, first, elevating environmental assessment standards can incentivize local governments to improve their oversight efforts. Second, collusion between incineration plants and local governments can be deterred by transferring benefits from the plants to the local government, while increased supervision by the central government and the enforcement of penalties for collusion can also mitigate collusion. Third, both central and local governments can bolster their supervisory and penalty mechanisms for instances of excessive pollution, encouraging incineration plants to invest more in pollution control. Finally, when the central government finds it challenging to detect excessive incineration-related pollution, enhancing rewards and penalties at the local government level can be a viable alternative.Originality/valueThis study stands out by considering the dynamic nature of pollutants. A differential game model is constructed which captures the evolving dynamics between local governments and incineration plants, offering insights regarding the prevention of collusion from a dynamic perspective. The findings may provide a valuable reference for governments as they develop and enforce regulations while motivating incineration plants to actively engage in reducing waste-incineration pollution.

作者

我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。

评论

主要评分

4.4
评分不足

次要评分

新颖性
-
重要性
-
科学严谨性
-
评价这篇论文

推荐

暂无数据
暂无数据