4.5 Article

First Price Auction is 1-1/e2 Efficient

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JOURNAL OF THE ACM
卷 70, 期 5, 页码 -

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ASSOC COMPUTING MACHINERY
DOI: 10.1145/3617902

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First price auction; Bayesian Nash Equilibrium; Price of Anarchy

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This study proves that the Price of Anarchy (PoA) of First Price Auctions is approximately 1 - 1/e(2), which is approximately 0.8647, closing the gap between the previously known bounds [0.7430, 0.8689].
We prove that the PoA of First Price Auctions is 1 - 1/e(2) approximate to 0.8647, closing the gap between the best known bounds [0.7430, 0.8689].

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