Resilient Event-Triggered Load Frequency Control for Cyber-Physical Power Systems Under DoS Attacks

In cyber-physical power systems (CPPSs), additional control as the compensating control plays a very important part in load frequency control (LFC) systems. The additional control in the LFC system is constrained by limited communication resources and cyber-attacks, which may cause performance degradation or destabilize the system. Accordingly, this paper proposes resilient event-triggered LFC for CPPSs with an additional control loop under denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. Firstly, a resilient event-triggered communication scheme is presented to reduce the occupation of communication resources under DoS attacks in the additional control loop. Then, different from existing event-triggered LFC systems, this paper establishes a novel switched LFC system model, where the resilient event generator is integrated into an additional control loop when suffering from DoS attacks. It is the first time that the additional control loop of the LFC system simultaneously considers communication resources and cyber-security. Furthermore, we derive exponential stabilization criteria by applying the Lyapunov stability theory based on the established model. Criteria are derived to obtain the weighting matrix and controller gain simultaneously by applying the linear matrix inequality technique. Finally, a one-area and two multi-area CPPSs with the additional control loop under DoS attacks are used to testify the availability of the proposed resilient event-triggered LFC scheme.

Automated summary

This paper proposes a resilient event-triggered load frequency control (LFC) scheme with an additional control loop for cyber-physical power systems (CPPSs), specifically designed to handle denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. By introducing a resilient event-triggered communication scheme and establishing a novel switched LFC system model, this scheme ensures stability and control by considering both communication resources and cyber-security.