A dynamic game model for no-take marine reserves

Representing about 8% of the world's oceans, marine protected areas (MPAs) are effective instruments for mitigating the damage that overfishing can do to ecological and economic systems. Yet, less than 2% of the ocean is proclaimed an exclusive no-take zone. Expecting their number and size to increase significantly in the coming years, meticulous implementation of MPAs is central to their success. Using a dynamic game model we explore the impact of designated no-take marine reserves on fish stock and on fishing strategies. Our findings suggest that optimality can be achieved in a context of a combination of three marine zones, i.e., an open access fishery, a marine protected area and a fish bank. Our methodology consists of considering an infinite time horizon discrete fishing game with a migratory species between the three regions. We analyze fishing strategies and characterize the model equilibria for different behaviors, the fully non-cooperative scheme, the social optimum and the cartel setting. Our analytical results are supported by the use of a numerical simulation that compares different scenarios, including the current state of the world in contrast to different sizes of MPAs and fish bank areas.

Automated summary

Marine protected areas (MPAs) cover approximately 8% of the world's oceans and are effective in mitigating the negative effects of overfishing. However, less than 2% of the ocean is designated as exclusive no-take zones. The implementation of MPAs is crucial for their success, and their number and size are expected to increase in the future.