4.7 Article

Double cyclic dominance promotes cooperation in spatial social dilemmas

期刊

CHAOS SOLITONS & FRACTALS
卷 173, 期 -, 页码 -

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PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2023.113649

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Cooperation; Prisoner's dilemma game; Cyclic dominance; Coevolution

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The emergence of cooperation is a challenging problem, but can be promoted through a coevolution mechanism where individuals adjust the strength of their relationships with neighbors. Agent-based simulations show that cooperative behavior is greatly enhanced under this mechanism, with an optimal ratio of co-evolutionary individuals contributing to the evolution of cooperation.
The emergence of cooperation is a challenging and important problem. In the realistic world, individuals usually make their opponents cooperate by strengthening the relationship between cooperative neighbors and themselves. Inspired by this phenomenon, a coevolution mechanism is introduced where some individuals can adjust the strength of the relationship between their neighbors and themselves, while others maintain the strength of the relationship regardless of their neighbors' strategies. Through agent-based simulations, we find that cooperative behavior is greatly promoted under the proposed mechanism, and there is an optimal ratio of co-evolutionary individuals for the evolution of cooperation. The potential reason is that under the optimal ratio, the system evolves into three classes which leads to double cycles of individuals with different strategies and weights.

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