Long-range mobility and cooperation evolution under condition of different information amounts

Increasing information can make actions more effective, thereby improving cooperation levels. However, this assumption lacks experimental support in the case of long-range migration, and the potential mechanism for higher cooperation rates resulting from inter-group migration is not yet clear. Therefore, we mainly studied the impact of four different information levels on group cooperation behavior from an experimental perspective through public goods game experiments in the context of long-range migration. The results indicate that the amount of information can significantly affect individual mobility and cooperation evolution. Defection prevails among players in the absence of information, leading to the formation of a stable cluster of defectors. However, with increased information about profit calculation rules, players tend to settle in favorable cooperative groups. Increased information about the decisions of other players speeds up the formation of stable cooperative groups. Excessive information disclosure about payoffs leads to increased mobility and reduced cooperation among group members. These findings provide insights into our understanding of the evolution history of human cooperation and the formation of groups.

Automated summary

This study examines the impact of four different levels of information on group cooperation behavior through public goods game experiments. The results show that the amount of information significantly affects individual mobility and cooperation evolution. Lack of information leads to defection and the formation of a stable cluster of defectors. However, increased information about profit calculation rules and the decisions of other players promote the formation of stable cooperative groups. Excessive information disclosure about payoffs leads to increased mobility and reduced cooperation among group members.