Relational approaches in bioethics: A guide to their differences

Contemporary critical approaches to bioethics increasingly present themselves as relational, though the meaning of relationality and its implications for bioethics seem to be many and varying. I argue that this confusion is due to a multiplicity of relational approaches originating from distinct theoretical lineages. In this article, I identify four key differences among commonly referenced relational approaches: the scope and nature of relationships considered, the extent of the determining influence on individual selfhood, and the integrity of individual selfhood. Importantly, these four differences carry consequences for the usage of relational approaches within academic and clinical bioethics. I show that these differences attach to multiple objects of critique within mainstream bioethics and imply distinct metaethical commitments. Although I issue a cautionary note about combining relational approaches from distinct lineages, I close by suggesting that many such approaches may have their use, drawing on Susan Sherwin's sense of bioethical theories as lenses.

Automated summary

Contemporary critical approaches to bioethics are increasingly based on relationality, but there is confusion due to the diverse theoretical lineages of relational approaches. This article identifies four key differences among commonly referenced relational approaches, which have consequences for their usage in academic and clinical bioethics. These differences are related to various objects of critique within mainstream bioethics and imply distinct metaethical commitments. The author suggests caution in combining relational approaches from different lineages, but also acknowledges their potential usefulness as lenses in bioethical theories, drawing on Susan Sherwin's perspective.