4.7 Article

Effects of interdependent network reciprocity on the evolution of public cooperation

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APPLIED MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTATION
卷 454, 期 -, 页码 -

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ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
DOI: 10.1016/j.amc.2023.128029

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Evolutionary games; Cooperation; Public good games; Interdependent networks

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This paper investigates the impact of resource interaction between interdependent networks on public cooperation. The redistribution mechanism of payoffs between the upper and bottom networks based on the gap of payoffs leads to a non-monotonic influence on the cooperation level of the upper network, while network reciprocity fails on the bottom network. The behavior of sponsors and recipients within cooperators and defectors contributes to the equilibrium state, which is attributed to the evolution of correlated cooperator pairs between interdependent networks. Our results provide a theoretical analysis of group cooperation induced by resource interaction factors.
This paper investigates the impact of resource interaction between interdependent net-works on public cooperation. The resource interaction is staged between the upper and bottom two-layer network and reallocates payoffs depending on the gap between the bottom network average payoff and players' payoff. It is shown that such a redistribu-tion mechanism effective the cooperation level on the upper network presents a non-monotonic influence, while the network reciprocity fails on the bottom network with the increment of resource interaction strength parameter & alpha;. By examining the behavior of sponsors and recipients within cooperators and defectors, the equilibrium state can be at-tributed to the evolution of correlated cooperator pairs between interdependent networks. Our results provided a theoretical analysis of the group cooperation induced by the re-source interaction factors.& COPY; 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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