期刊
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
卷 94, 期 1, 页码 25-42出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11153-023-09868-z
关键词
Theism; Theistic arguments; Natural theology; Ethics; Metaethics; Moral realism; Evolutionary debunking arguments; Moral skepticism
In this essay, I argue that theism is more probable than naturalism based on the assumption that human beings can have mostly accurate and complete moral knowledge. I defend this argument by explaining that if naturalism is true, our moral intuitions are likely selected for utility rather than truth, therefore making them probably false. I respond to objections regarding skeptical challenges, ethical naturalism, and the harmony between utility and truth-values of moral beliefs.
In this essay, I argue that, all else being equal, theism is more probable than naturalism on the assumption that human beings are able to arrive at a body of moral knowledge that is largely accurate and complete. I put forth this thesis on grounds that, if naturalism is true, the explanation of the content of our moral intuitions terminates either in biological-evolutionary processes or in social conventions adopted for pragmatic reasons; that, if this is so, our moral intuitions were selected for their utility, not their truth; and that, if our moral intuitions were so selected, they are probably false. I defend the argument against three objections: first, that the argument amounts to a generic skeptical challenge; second, that ethical naturalism explains how our moral intuitions could have been selected for their truth; and third, that there is a pre-established harmony between the utility of moral beliefs and their truth-values.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据