Moral knowledge and the existence of god

In this essay, I argue that, all else being equal, theism is more probable than naturalism on the assumption that human beings are able to arrive at a body of moral knowledge that is largely accurate and complete. I put forth this thesis on grounds that, if naturalism is true, the explanation of the content of our moral intuitions terminates either in biological-evolutionary processes or in social conventions adopted for pragmatic reasons; that, if this is so, our moral intuitions were selected for their utility, not their truth; and that, if our moral intuitions were so selected, they are probably false. I defend the argument against three objections: first, that the argument amounts to a generic skeptical challenge; second, that ethical naturalism explains how our moral intuitions could have been selected for their truth; and third, that there is a pre-established harmony between the utility of moral beliefs and their truth-values.

Automated summary

In this essay, I argue that theism is more probable than naturalism based on the assumption that human beings can have mostly accurate and complete moral knowledge. I defend this argument by explaining that if naturalism is true, our moral intuitions are likely selected for utility rather than truth, therefore making them probably false. I respond to objections regarding skeptical challenges, ethical naturalism, and the harmony between utility and truth-values of moral beliefs.