The information-theoretic view of quantum mechanics and the measurement problem(s)

Until recently Jeffrey Bub and Itamar Pitowsky, in the framework of an information-theoretic view of quantum mechanics, claimed first that to the measurement problem in its ordinary formulation there correspond in effect two measurement problems (simply called the big and the small measurement problems), with a different degree of relevance and, second, that the analysis of a quantum measurement is a problem only if other assumptions - taken by Pitowsky and Bub to be unnecessary 'dogmas' - are assumed. Here I critically discuss this unconventional stance on the measurement problem and argue that the Bub-Pitowsky arguments are inconclusive, mainly because they rely on an unwarranted extension to the quantum realm of a distinction concerning the foundations of special relativity which is in itself rather controversial.

Automated summary

Bub and Pitowsky claimed that there are in fact two measurement problems, the big and the small, which have different degrees of relevance in the framework of an information-theoretic view of quantum mechanics. They also argue that the analysis of quantum measurement becomes a problem only if unnecessary assumptions, which they consider as dogmas, are made. However, I criticize their unconventional stance on the measurement problem and point out that their arguments rely on a controversial extension concerning the foundations of special relativity in the quantum realm.