4.7 Article

The incentives for information sharing in online retail platforms

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PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2023.103050

关键词

Platform retailing; Information sharing; Demand uncertainty; Co-opetition

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Compared to traditional retail, e-commerce has advantages in collecting consumer demand information. Big data technology can help online platforms forecast accurate demand and improve operations. This study investigates the incentives for sharing forecast information in an e-commerce setting, considering different platform operation modes (with or without platform encroachment). The analysis shows that online platforms have incentives to share forecast information with third-party retailers but not with manufacturers when there is no encroachment. When encroachment occurs, the platform may or may not share forecast information, depending on product substitutability and commission rates.
Compared with the traditional brick-and-mortar retail industry, e-commerce has numerous advantages in the collection of consumer demand information, and big data technology can help online platforms forecast accurate demand information from the collected data, which can then be used to improve business operations. To investigate the incentives for sharing the forecast information with or without platform encroachment, this paper establishes stylized analytical models in an e-commerce setting consisting of a manufacturer, an online platform and a thirdparty retailer (as a reseller). Depending on whether the online platform encroachment happens or not, we consider two different platform operation modes, namely, the mode without platform encroachment where only the third-party retailer sells products, and the mode with platform encroachment where both the online platform and the third-party retailer sell products. Our analysis shows that when the online platform does not encroach, it has no incentives to share forecast information with the manufacturer, but always has incentives to share forecast information with the third-party retailer. Interestingly, when the online platform encroaches, the online platform may share forecast information, depending on the level of substitutability between products and commission rate charged by it, either only with the third-party retailer, or with both the manufacturer and the third-party retailer, or with none of them.

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