4.5 Article

Contextualising credit transactions in artisanal marine fishing: insights from Kerala, India

期刊

REVIEWS IN FISH BIOLOGY AND FISHERIES
卷 33, 期 3, 页码 699-715

出版社

SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11160-023-09782-7

关键词

Small scale fisheries; Interest rate; Contract theory; Interlocked transactions; Parametric insurance; Fish marketing; Fisheries co-operatives

向作者/读者索取更多资源

This paper investigates credit transactions in artisanal marine fishing in Kerala, India. It examines the structure and composition of credit, interlocked credit-market and credit-labour transactions, segmentation of credit market, interest rate variations, and the reasons for high penetration of informal credit in marine fisheries. The study concludes that informal credit addresses the high income variability in marine fishing, while the formal system fails to develop credit products internalising the risk element. The traditional triadic system of trust in the informal credit system is weakening due to external forces.
The paper investigates the nature of credit transactions in artisanal marine fishing in a developing economy by analysing the case of Kerala, a south Indian state of India. The study examined the structure of credit in marine fishing and its composition; interlocked credit-market and credit-labour transactions; segmentation of credit market; interest rate variations, and the potential reasons for high penetration of informal credit in marine fisheries in the background of a relatively better developed formal financing system in sectors outside fishing. The study concludes that the risk-sharing role of the informal credit in addressing the high variability of the income stream in marine fishing and the failure of the formal system to develop credit products internalising the risk element perpetuates the informal credit dominated by output-credit interlocking between fishers and auctioneer-creditors. While the fishers share the risk of high variability in income stream through the sharing arrangement, the auctioneer-creditors are assuring the flow of fish to be auctioned. However, the system is not without exploitative elements triggered by the monopoly power of stakeholders, particularly auctioneer-lenders. The traditional triadic system involving fishers, auctioneer-lenders and the society as regulators of trust that sustained the informal credit system is weakening due to extraneous forces. The study highlights the need to have credit products that bundle insurance.

作者

我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。

评论

主要评分

4.5
评分不足

次要评分

新颖性
-
重要性
-
科学严谨性
-
评价这篇论文

推荐

暂无数据
暂无数据