4.2 Article

Consciousness, (meta)cognition, and culture

期刊

QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
卷 76, 期 8, 页码 1711-1723

出版社

SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD
DOI: 10.1177/17470218231164502

关键词

Precision; schizophrenia; habit; top-down control

向作者/读者索取更多资源

Our conscious experience is influenced by both top-down processes, such as prior beliefs, and bottom-up processes, such as sensations. The balance between these processes depends on their reliability, with more reliable estimates given more weight. We have the ability to modify these estimates at the metacognitive level, allowing us to prioritize either prior beliefs or sensations. However, this flexibility comes at a cost, as an excessive reliance on top-down processes can lead to distorted perceptions and false beliefs, as seen in conditions like schizophrenia. At the highest level of cognitive hierarchy, metacognitive control becomes conscious, allowing us to form beliefs about abstract entities based on limited direct experience and the experiences of others. Our confidence in these higher-level beliefs is heavily influenced by culture and social group, often at the expense of direct experience.
Our conscious experience is determined by a combination of top-down processes (e.g., prior beliefs) and bottom-up processes (e.g., sensations). The balance between these two processes depends on estimates of their reliability (precision), so that the estimate considered more reliable is given more weight. We can modify these estimates at the metacognitive level, changing the relative weights of priors and sensations. This enables us, for example, to direct our attention to weak stimuli. But there is a cost to this malleability. For example, excessive weighting of top-down processes, as in schizophrenia, can lead to perceiving things that are not there and believing things that are not true. It is only at the top of the brain's cognitive hierarchy that metacognitive control becomes conscious. At this level, our beliefs concern complex, abstract entities with which we have limited direct experience. Estimates of the precision of such beliefs are more uncertain and more malleable. However, at this level, we do not need to rely on our own limited experience. We can rely instead on the experiences of others. Explicit metacognition plays a unique role, enabling us to share our experiences. We acquire our beliefs about the world from our immediate social group and from our wider culture. And the same sources provide us with better estimates of the precision of these beliefs. Our confidence in our high-level beliefs is heavily influenced by culture at the expense of direct experience.

作者

我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。

评论

主要评分

4.2
评分不足

次要评分

新颖性
-
重要性
-
科学严谨性
-
评价这篇论文

推荐

暂无数据
暂无数据