Revisiting two dogmas of conservation science

Conservation science is a morally motivated field, with implicit and explicit values built into its practice. As such, conservationists must engage with conservation ethics to interrogate underlying values. We examine cutting-edge ecological science and contemporary ethics to revisit two conservation norms that have become dogmatic in the field: ecological collectives, but not individual animals, are valuable and anthropomorphism should be staunchly avoided. Emerging studies demonstrate that individuals and their intraspecific variation can be instrumentally valuable for conservation science, and there is an emerging consensus within environmental philosophy around the moral worth of individuals. Thus, we suggest conservation science should explicitly recognize the value of individuals. We also argue that avoiding anthropomorphism is detrimental to conservation because critical anthropomorphism enables a more nuanced scientific approach-allowing conservationists to ask enlightened questions with creativity and compassion. We provide evidence that both dogmatic norms are scientifically and morally outdated and propose new normative values to push conservation towards more robust science and ethical practice.

Automated summary

Conservation science is a field with implicit and explicit values, and conservationists must engage with conservation ethics to examine these values. Recent studies show that individual animals and their variation are valuable for conservation science, and there is a growing consensus in environmental philosophy on the moral worth of individuals. Avoiding anthropomorphism is detrimental to conservation, as critical anthropomorphism allows for a more nuanced and compassionate scientific approach. We provide evidence that these dogmatic norms are outdated and propose new normative values for more robust conservation science and ethical practice.