Strong Players and Stable Coalition Structures in PMAS Profit Game

In a non-negative profit game that possesses a Population Monotonic Allocation Scheme (PMAS), being a member of a larger coalition implies that your profit cannot decrease. In this paper, we refer to such games as PMAS profit games. As population monotonicity is a nice and desirable property that encourages formation of larger coalitions and implies stability of the grand coalition, we explore if this special feature of PMAS games can help in identifying additional stable coalition structures under different stability concepts in cooperative games-namely, core partitions, the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable set, the largest consistent set, and the equilibrium process of coalition formation (EPCF)-and in developing relationships between coalition structures that are stable under these different stability concepts. We first define two special classes of players for PMAS profit games-extreme and strong players-and use them to develop an algorithm for construction of stable (core) partitions. We also use extreme players to identify absorbing states for equilibrium processes of coalition formation with high level of farsightedness. We then explore the impact of population monotonicity on the relationship between stable coalition structures under abovementioned stability concepts. While we are able to obtain some results related to stability of the grand coalition and to establish relationships between stable coalition structures under different stability notions that are consistent with the existing body of knowledge, population monotonicity in general does not add enough for strengthening of the existing results. However, we are able to show a couple of more general result that hold for arbitrary cooperative TU profit games. That is, we show that the members of vNM farsighted stable sets are core partitions, and that core partitions are members of a vNM stable sets. Moreover, we show that the members of vNM farsighted stable sets are EPCF-stable partitions.

Automated summary

This paper investigates PMAS profit games with population monotonicity, exploring stable coalition structures and developing relationships under different stability concepts in cooperative games. The study shows that while population monotonicity does not significantly strengthen existing results, there are still general results applicable to arbitrary cooperative games, such as the relationship between vNM farsighted stable sets and core partitions.