Wie fuhlt sich Schonheit an? Zur Phanomenologie des interesselosen Wohlgefallens bei Kant

One of Kant's most influential claims concerning beauty is that the pleasure in the beautiful is disinterested. However, what exactly this means has been highly disputed. In this article I will consider several interpretations of the thesis of disinterestedness, most importantly a phenomenological interpretation. I will show that only on this latter interpretation can we understand how the thesis of disinterestedness constitutes the starting point of Kant's investigations into the realm of beauty. As I argue, we should take seriously the idea that beauty is grounded in a peculiar feeling, that is, in something that is felt. What is it like to feel beauty? Beauty feels disinterested, that is, detached from any wanting or desiring.

Automated summary

One of Kant's influential claims is that pleasure in beauty is disinterested. The article explores different interpretations of this claim, focusing on the phenomenological interpretation. It argues that only through this interpretation can we understand how disinterestedness forms the foundation of Kant's investigations into beauty. The article emphasizes the idea that beauty is grounded in a unique feeling, detached from any desires or wants.