期刊
JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS
卷 51, 期 2, 页码 439-456出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
DOI: 10.1016/j.jce.2023.01.002
关键词
Saving; Nudges; Commitment devices; Reminders; Peer information; Goal setting; Boomerang effects; Middle-income; Romania
类别
We conducted a field experiment in Romania to examine the effects of informational nudges and goal setting on saving behavior. Our findings show that text message reminders, whether general or about peers' saving goals, do not encourage saving. Moreover, both types of messages actually discourage saving for participants who set a goal, especially high goal setters. We propose that informational nudges unintentionally increase the significance of unrealistic goals and lead to boomerang effects that discourage high goal setters from saving. Among participants who did not receive any messages, those who set goals save more, indicating a tradeoff between commitment devices and informational nudges in this particular context.
We implement a field experiment in Romania to elucidate how informational nudges and goal setting impact saving. We find no evidence that text message reminders, either in the form of a general reminder or information about the saving goals of peers, encourage saving. Further, both types of messages discourage saving for participants who set a goal, particularly among high goal setters. We posit that informational nudges unintentionally increase the salience of unrealistic goals and engender boomerang effects that discourage high goal setters from saving. Among participants who received no messages, those who set goals save more, suggesting a tradeoff between commitment devices and informational nudges in this context.
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