Resilient Load Frequency Control of Multi-Area Power Systems Under DoS Attacks

Cyber security of modern power systems has become increasingly significant due to their open communication architecture and expanding network connectivity exposed to malicious cyber attacks. Resilient control represents an effective means to preserve the survivability of the power system under cyber attacks. In this paper, we address the resilient load frequency control (LFC) design for multi-area power systems under a new class of time-constrained denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. First, different from the widely-explored duration- and frequency-constrained DoS attack models, we consider a general time-constrained DoS attack model where only the attack durations are confined into some bounds, which represents less a priori knowledge of an attacker's actions. Second, instead of using a traditional yet conservative time-invariant Lyapunov function (TILF), we develop an attack-parameter-dependent time-varying Lyapunov function (TVLF) approach to enable a resilient LFC design without jeopardizing the desired closed-loop system stability and performance. Furthermore, we provide a formal stability and performance analysis condition as well as a design criterion for the desired DoS-resilient output feedback LFC controller. We also show that the minimum allowable sleeping period and the maximum allowable active period of the attacked LFC system can be explicitly disclosed. Finally, we present two simulation case studies on a two-area LFC system and a three-area LFC system to demonstrate the effectiveness of the obtained results.

Automated summary

In this paper, a resilient load frequency control (LFC) design method is proposed for multi-area power systems under a new class of time-constrained denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. A time-varying Lyapunov function (TVLF) approach, which is dependent on the attack parameters, is developed to enable a resilient LFC design without compromising system stability and performance. The minimum allowable sleeping period and the maximum allowable active period of the attacked LFC system can be explicitly disclosed. Two simulation case studies are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.