期刊
COMPUTERS & INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING
卷 174, 期 -, 页码 -出版社
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.cie.2022.108759
关键词
Pricing; Service level; Stackelberg game; Misreport behavior; Fairness concern
资金
- National Natural Science Founda-tion of China
- Shanghai Philosophy and Social Science Foundation of China
- National Major Social Science Foundation of China
- [72171123]
- [72171149]
- [2020BGL010]
- [21ZDA105]
Research shows that misreporting behavior by the manufacturer is harmful to the retailer, while fairness concern behavior by the retailer can lead to a decrease in the manufacturer's profit but also help in dealing with the manufacturer's misreport behavior. Manufacturers can benefit from appropriately misreporting in response to the retailer's fairness concern behavior.
In the supply chain, there exists the phenomenon that misreport behavior and fairness concern coexist. The reference point for fairness concern is usually upstream publicly disclosed profit, whereas upstream may hide its true information. Few research investigates the phenomenon deeply. To address the gap, this paper studies a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer with possible misreport behavior and one retailer with possible fairness concern. Four Stackelberg game supply chain models are constructed. Optimal decisions and profits under different scenarios are solved simultaneously and compared, and find that: Firstly, the manufacturer's misreporting behavior is harmful to the retailer. Secondly, the retailer's fairness concern behavior will shorten the manufacturer's profit and help itself to face manufacturer's misreport behavior. Thirdly, face to the retailer's fairness concern, the manufacturer can benefit from appropriately misreporting. Through numerical analysis and extension to one-to-many general situation, the above findings are verified and analyzed.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据