Social norms of fairness with reputation-based role assignment in the dictator game

A vast body of experiments share the view that social norms are major factors for the emergence of fairness in a population of individuals playing the dictator game (DG). Recently, to explore which social norms are conducive to sustaining cooperation has obtained considerable concern. However, thus, far few studies have investigated how social norms influence the evolution of fairness by means of indirect reciprocity. In this study, we propose an indirect reciprocal model of the DG and consider that an individual can be assigned as the dictator due to its good reputation. We investigate the leading eight norms and all second-order social norms by a two-timescale theoretical analysis. We show that when role assignment is based on reputation, four of the leading eight norms, including stern judging and simple standing, lead to a high level of fairness, which increases with the selection intensity. Our work also reveals that not only the correct treatment of making a fair split with good recipients but also distinguishing unjustified unfair split from justified unfair split matters in elevating the level of fairness. Published under an exclusive license by AIP Publishing.

Automated summary

Social norms play a significant role in the emergence of fairness in the dictator game. However, there are limited studies on how social norms influence the evolution of fairness through indirect reciprocity. This study proposes an indirect reciprocal model and finds that specific dominant norms can lead to high levels of fairness in reputation-based role assignment.