Misfitting, Breakdowns, and the Normal in Merleau-Ponty

Distinguishing between normal and non-normal cases of perception and motricity is a key part of Merleau-Ponty's methodology in Phenomenology of Perception. Many feminist philosophers and disability scholars have criticized this use of the normal/nonnormal binary and the presumptions behind it. Others have embraced his methodology and noted its consonance with contemporary feminist, disability, and philosophy of race scholarship. In this paper, I present my own interpretation of what Merleau-Ponty means by normal. I draw on Rosemarie Garland-Thomson's concept of fit and also draw attention to the broader existential-phenomenological framework within which Merleau-Ponty is working. This re-framing of the term does two things. First, it provides a clear picture of the hidden methodology at work in Phenomenology of Perception. Second, it offers the possibility of grounding the concept of fit in an existential-phenomenological conception of the self.

Automated summary

This paper presents the author's interpretation of Merleau-Ponty's concept of normal in Phenomenology of Perception, drawing on the concept of fit and the existential-phenomenological framework. The reframing of the term provides a clear understanding of the hidden methodology and offers the possibility of grounding the concept of fit in an existential-phenomenological conception of the self.