期刊
IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL
卷 9, 期 18, 页码 17488-17502出版社
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/JIOT.2022.3155631
关键词
Auction; blockchain; crowdsourcing; incentive mechanism; social cost; social welfare
资金
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [62072351]
- Academy of Finland [308087, 335262, 345072, 350464]
- Open Project of Zhejiang Lab [2021PD0AB01]
- 111 Project [B16037]
The article proposes a novel incentive mechanism for blockchain-based crowdsourcing systems, aiming to achieve multiple objectives including maximizing crowdsourcer utility, social welfare, social grade, and minimizing social cost.
Blockchain has been applied for decentralized crowdsourcing management by deploying a number of miners to reach a consensus on crowdsourced task allocation and payment decision. In a blockchain-based crowdsourcing system (BCS), incentive becomes essential to motivate the participation and cooperation of all system entities. However, existing literature scarcely investigates how to motivate heterogeneous crowdsourcers, workers, and miners simultaneously toward satisfying multiple objectives without the support of centralized management. In this article, we propose GAIMMO, a novel grade-driven auction-based incentive mechanism for BCS with multiple objectives in mind: crowdsourcer utility maximization, social welfare maximization, social grade maximization, and social cost minimization. Concretely, we propose a grade-based task sorting (GTS) algorithm to determine the service priority of heterogeneous crowdsourcers in order to motivate their cooperative behaviors, which consequently maximizes crowdsourcer utility when combining with the carefully designed utility functions of other system entities. We propose a grade-based utility function of workers and employ a hierarchical premium-based task assignment (PTA) algorithm to realize social welfare maximization, social grade maximization, and social cost minimization. We further propose a fixed-grade-sum and grade-based reward-sharing (FGSGRS) method to encourage fast block generation and motivate high-grade miners without damaging the profits of the crowdsourcers. We conduct simulation-based experiments to show the effectiveness and advance of our proposed incentive mechanism in stimulating the participation willingness of high-grade system entities and achieving the multiple objectives.
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