Bringing cumulative technological culture beyond copying versus reasoning

The dominant view of cumulative technological culture suggests that highfidelity transmission rests upon a high-fidelity copying ability, which allows individuals to reproduce the tool-use actions performed by others without needing to understand them (i.e., without causal reasoning). The opposition between copying versus reasoning is well accepted but with little supporting evidence. In this article, we investigate this distinction by examining the cognitive science literature on tool use. Evidence indicates that the ability to reproduce others' tool-use actions requires causal understanding, which questions the copying versus reasoning distinction and the cognitive reality of the so-called copying ability. We conclude that new insights might be gained by considering causal understanding as a key driver of cumulative technological culture.

Automated summary

The prevailing belief in cumulative technological culture is that high-fidelity transmission relies on the ability to accurately copy tool-use actions without understanding them. This article challenges the distinction between copying and reasoning by examining the cognitive science literature on tool use. Evidence suggests that reproducing others' tool-use actions actually requires causal understanding, thus casting doubt on the cognitive reality of the so-called copying ability. The authors suggest that considering causal understanding as a key driver of cumulative technological culture could lead to new insights.