期刊
TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART E-LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION REVIEW
卷 165, 期 -, 页码 -出版社
PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.tre.2022.102862
关键词
Supply chain strategy; Customer returns; Contract; Pricing; Game theory
类别
资金
- Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [71871186, 71871184]
- Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities [JBK190504]
- Guanghua Talent Project of Southwestern University of Finance and Economics
This paper investigates return management strategies in a supply chain by using a game theoretical model. The research explores the optimal strategies for a manufacturer and a retailer facing customer returns. The findings show that different strategies can achieve Pareto improvement for all stakeholders in the supply chain.
Managing customer returns is a supply chain issue; manufacturers typically manage them through buyback contracts, while retailers can attempt to recover a product's salvage value, or sell it as an open-box item. This paper investigates returns management strategies by developing a game theoretical model for a supply chain with a manufacturer (Stackelberg leader) and a retailer (the follower) facing customer returns. The manufacturer chooses either a buyback or a wholesale -price contract. Under a wholesale-price contract, the retailer either salvages or resells returned products. We identify the optimal returns management strategy. We show that each of the three strategies may achieve Pareto improvement for both supply chain members, and for the customers and society. The retailer's choice to resell or not depends on its inspection cost, or the system efficiency of the supply chain in reselling a returned product relative to that in selling a new product. The manufacturer's choice of contract depends on whether it can salvage a returned product more efficiently than the retailer, and on the retailer's unit inspection cost of the returned product. We capture a few identifiable quantities and thresholds that help the manufacturer and the retailer to simplify decision making.
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