Truthfulness of a Network Resource-Sharing Protocol

We consider a sharing economy over a network in which each vertex agent allocates resources to its neighbors in response to their contributions. General equilibrium theory can be applied here to solve the problem of deciding how to fairly and efficiently allocate resources among agents as resource sharing over the network can be modeled as a pure exchange economy. It is known that proportional sharing dynamics converges to a market equilibrium solution. We are particularly interested in proportional sharing dynamics as a mechanism for network resource sharing. Our focus is on the key issue in internet market design: whether an agent may manipulate its report of its own private information to gain more resources under this mechanism. This work establishes the first mathematical proof that such a practical distributed network resource-sharing protocol is truthful against the manipulative strategies of feasible weight misreporting and edge deletion applied both individually and together.

Automated summary

This study examines the problem of resource allocation in a network-based sharing economy, using a pure exchange economy model and applying general equilibrium theory. The focus is on proportional sharing dynamics as a mechanism for network resource sharing, specifically exploring the issue of whether agents may manipulate their private information reports to gain more resources under this mechanism. The study provides the first mathematical proof that this practical distributed network resource-sharing protocol is truthful against manipulative strategies like feasible weight misreporting and edge deletion applied individually and together.