期刊
JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY
卷 548, 期 -, 页码 -出版社
ACADEMIC PRESS LTD- ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2022.111202
关键词
Indirect reciprocity; Prisoner?s dilemma; Evolution of cooperation; Perturbation
资金
- Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) - Ministry of Education [NRF-2020R1I1A2071670]
- Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) (JSPS KAKENHI) [18H03621, 21K03362]
This research analyzes the relationship between reputation and cooperation using perturbation, clarifying the importance of reputation assessment in maintaining cooperation, and the impact of justified punishment and disregarding irrelevant information on the stability of social norms.
Reputation is one of key mechanisms to maintain human cooperation, but its analysis gets complicated if we consider the possibility that reputation does not reach consensus because of erroneous assessment. The difficulty is alleviated if we assume that reputation and cooperation do not take binary values but have continuous spectra so that disagreement over reputation can be analysed in a perturbative way. In this work, we carry out the analysis by expanding the dynamics of reputation to the second order of perturbation under the assumption that everyone initially cooperates with good reputation. The second-order theory clarifies the difference between Image Scoring and Simple Standing in that punishment for defection against a well-reputed player should be regarded as good for maintaining cooperation. Moreover, comparison among the leading eight shows that the stabilizing effect of justified punishment weakens if cooperation between two ill-reputed players is regarded as bad. Our analysis thus explains how Simple Standing achieves a high level of stability by permitting justified punishment and also by disregarding irrelevant information in assessing cooperation. This observation suggests which factors affect the stability of a social norm when reputation can be perturbed by noise.(c) 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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