4.7 Article

Dynamic pricing in the presence of strategic consumers with 'experience-in-store-and-buy-online'

期刊

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION RESEARCH
卷 61, 期 20, 页码 6873-6890

出版社

TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
DOI: 10.1080/00207543.2022.2138615

关键词

OR in marketing; dynamic pricing; strategic consumers; resolving uncertainty; intertemporal showrooming

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This paper examines the effects of inspection service provision on the interactions between a dynamic-pricing retailer and strategic consumers in the context of the Experience-in-store-and-buy-online (ESBO) strategy. The findings indicate that allowing first-period inspection benefits the retailer, as it deters strategic deferral and increases consumer purchases in the first period. Furthermore, the seemingly negative intertemporal showrooming behavior actually benefits the retailer. Allowing two-period inspection, along with the availability of inspection in the second period, leads to increased prices and profits for the retailer.
Experience-in-store-and-buy-online (ESBO) is a popular omni-channel strategy. This paper studies the effects of inspection service provision on the interactions of a dynamic-pricing retailer and strategic consumers, i.e., the effects of the ESBO initiative on store operations. Selling a seasonal product over two periods, the omni-channel retailer may allow consumers to inspect this product offline only in the first period (first-period inspection) or in both periods (two-period inspection). First, we find that allowing first-period inspection makes the retailer better off. The retailer will price the product higher in the first period but probably lower in the second period. Even so, more consumers will purchase in the first period: that is, allowing first-period inspection can somewhat deter strategic deferral. Meanwhile, the seemingly negative intertemporal showrooming behavior (i.e., inspect the product offline in the first period but defer online purchase to the second period) benefits the retailer. Compared to first-period inspection, allowing two-period inspection increases the retailer's prices in both periods as well as profit, provided that inspection is definitely available in the second period. On the other hand, when inspection is possible in the second period, it may be profitable to allow inspection only in the first period..

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