Network Characteristic Control of Social Dilemmas in a Public Good Game: Numerical Simulation of Agent-Based Nonlinear Dynamics

This paper proposes a possible mechanism for obtaining sizeable behavioral structures by simulating a network-agent dynamic on an evolutionary public good game with available social .learning. The model considers a population with a fixed number of players. In each round, the chosen players may contribute part of their value to a common pool. Then, each player may imitate the strategy of another player based on relative payoffs (whoever has the lower payoff adopts the strategy of the other player) and change his or her strategy using different exploratory variables. Relative payoffs are subject to incentives, including participation costs, but may also be subject to mutation, whose rate is sensitized by the network characteristics (social ties). The process discussed in this report is interesting and relevant across a broad range of disciplines that use game theory, including cultural evolutionary dynamics.

Automated summary

This paper proposes a mechanism for obtaining behavioral structures by simulating network-agent dynamics in an evolutionary public good game with available social learning. Relative payoffs and mutation play significant roles in the evolution of player strategies.