Putting inference to the best explanation into context

It is often assumed that Inference to the Best Explanation, or 'IBE', belongs to the context of justification. But several recent developments might lead one to ask whether it is more appropriate to situate it in the context of pursuit. Peircean abduction, which has been designated as an immediate precursor to IBE, is, according to recent scholarship, best located in the context of discovery and pursuit, rather than justification. Furthermore, alleged difficulties in reconciling IBE with Bayesianism have led to a proposal for giving IBE a non-justificatory role, which is close to that of pursuit. I argue, however, that these considerations do not make a strong case for locating IBE in the context of pursuit. Although abduction plays an important role in the context of pursuit, IBE is not simply a renaming of abduction. It has been reconceptualised in a way which makes it unsuitable to operate in the context of pursuit. Considerations concerning the compatibility between IBE and Bayesianism also do not give strong grounds to locate IBE outside the context of justification. This is because we should not expect that the context of justification can be characterised in purely probabilistic terms. Thus IBE should continue to be regarded as a candidate for characterising epistemic appraisal in the context of justification.

Automated summary

This article discusses the positioning of Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), arguing against situating it in the context of pursuit, as recent developments do not make a strong case for it. While Peircean abduction plays a role in pursuit, IBE is not a mere renaming of abduction. Considerations regarding the compatibility between IBE and Bayesianism also do not provide strong grounds for locating IBE outside the context of justification.