4.7 Article

Detection of False Data Injection Attacks on Smart Grids: A Resilience-Enhanced Scheme

期刊

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYSTEMS
卷 37, 期 4, 页码 2679-2692

出版社

IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TPWRS.2021.3127353

关键词

Smart grids; Phasor measurement units; Power measurement; State estimation; Numerical models; Protocols; Performance evaluation; Smart grids; state estimation; false data injection (FDI) attacks; collusion attacks; system resilience

资金

  1. National Key Research and Development Program of China [2020YFB1805400]
  2. National Natural Science Foundation of China [62002248]
  3. China Postdoctoral Science Foundation [2019TQ0217, 2020M673277]
  4. Provincial Key Research and Development Program of Sichuan [20ZDYF3145]
  5. Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities [YJ201933]
  6. China International Postdoctoral Exchange Fellowship Program (Talent-Introduction)
  7. Future Resilient Systems (FRS-II) Project at the Singapore-ETH Centre (SEC) by the National Research Foundation of Singapore (NRF) under its Campus for Research Excellence and Technological Enterprise (CREATE) Program
  8. Cloud Technology Endowed Professorship

向作者/读者索取更多资源

The integration of phasor measurement units (PMUs) and phasor data concentrators (PDCs) in smart grids may be exploited by attackers to initiate new and sophisticated false data injection (FDI) attacks. This paper proposes a secure and resilience-enhanced scheme (SeCDM) to detect and mitigate such cyber threats in smart grids. The findings demonstrate the effectiveness and low overheads of the proposed method.
The integration of phasor measurement units (PMUs) and phasor data concentrators (PDCs) in smart grids may be exploited by attackers to initiate new and sophisticated false data injection (FDI) attacks. Existing FDI attack mitigation approaches are generally less effective against sophisticated FDI attacks, such as collusive false data injection (CFDI) attacks launched by compromised PDCs (and PMUs) as we demonstrate in this paper. Thus, we propose a secure and resilience-enhanced scheme (SeCDM) to detect and mitigate such cyber threats in smart grids. Specifically, we design a decentralized homomorphic computation paradigm along with a hierarchical knowledge sharing algorithm to facilitate secure ciphertext calculation of state estimation residuals. Following this, a centralized FDI detector is implemented to detect FDI attacks. Findings from the security analysis demonstrate our approach achieves enhanced conventional FDI and CFDI attack resilience, and findings from our performance evaluations on the standard IEEE 14-, 24-, and 39-bus power systems also show that the communication overheads and computational complexity are reasonably low.

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