4.3 Article

Against the generalised theory of function

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BIOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY
卷 37, 期 4, 页码 -

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SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s10539-022-09861-2

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Philosophy of biology; Philosophy of psychiatry; Neural selection; Biological function; Neuroplasticity

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This paper critiques Justin Garson's Generalised Selected Effects Theory and argues for its rejection. The author contends that Garson's theory fails to demonstrate that neurally selected disorders are not dysfunctional, but rather implies that they have both functional and dysfunctional aspects. Based on this analysis, the paper concludes that the Generalised Theory presents conflicting functional norms and should be rejected outright.
Justin Garson has recently advanced a Generalised Selected Effects Theory of biological proper function. According to Garson, his theory spells trouble for the Dysfunction Account of Disorder. This paper argues that Garson's critique of the Dysfunction Account from the Generalised Theory fails, and that we should reject the Generalised Theory outright. I first show that the Generalised Theory does not, as Garson asserts, imply that neurally selected disorders are not dysfunctional. Rather, it implies that they are both functional and dysfunctional. I argue on this basis that the Generalised Theory yields conflicting functional norms, and we that should reject it outright on these grounds.

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