期刊
JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION
卷 133, 期 -, 页码 402-413出版社
ELSEVIER SCI LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2016.05.097
关键词
Fairness concerns; Low-carbon supply chain; Co-op advertising; Co-op advertising and emission reduction cost sharing; Pareto improvement
资金
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [71171201, 71171202, 71431006, 71221006, 71471178]
- Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of China [2011RWSK003]
Governments' energy-saving emission reduction policies and consumers' low-carbon preference have important implications for an enterprise's production operations. In this paper, we consider a low-carbon supply chain channel with one manufacturer and one retailer and show how to optimize the low-carbon supply chain management decision and improve the supply chain performance through contract design. This paper analyzes how the co-op advertising contract and the co-op advertising & emission reduction cost sharing contracts impact the low-carbon supply chain's optimal decision and coordination. We also explore how the optimal decision and coordination change when a retailer has fairness concerns. We have several findings. First, regardless of whether or not the retailer has fairness concerns, a co-op advertising contract cannot achieve channel coordination, but can enhance channel effectiveness; Second, when the retailer does not have fairness concerns, the co-op advertising and emission reduction cost sharing contracts can achieve channel coordination and achieve win win situation under certain conditions; Third, the retailer's fairness concerns can change the co-op advertising and emission reduction cost sharing contracts' coordination in some cases. Our study contributes to the theoretical basis for the design of low-carbon supply chain cooperation contracts, especially in cases where the retailer has fairness concerns. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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