4.3 Article

Water property rights in investor-state contracts on extractive activities, affects water governance: An empirical assessment of 80 contracts in Africa and Asia

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WILEY
DOI: 10.1111/reel.12436

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资金

  1. European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union [101020082]
  2. IHE Delft Institute for Water Education
  3. European Research Council (ERC) [101020082] Funding Source: European Research Council (ERC)

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This article examines the evolution of water property rights in investor-State contracts regarding mineral, petroleum, and land issues in Africa and Asia. The study finds that water allocation is not only governed by a State's water law, but also implicitly regulated by contracts and international investment treaties. The granting of contracts to foreign international investors results in the de facto privatization of water, reducing the State's ability to regulate water resources during the contract term. Furthermore, long-term quasi property rights granted to investors in these contracts pose challenges to adaptive water governance in the face of increasing climate change impacts.
In view of increasing globalization, the ongoing promotion of foreign direct investment and the lack of comparative literature on how water property rights are changing in the global South, this article asks: How have property rights in water evolved through investor-State contracts on mineral, petroleum and land issues in Africa and Asia? We analyse 80 publicly available contracts-22 minerals, 40 petroleum and 18 land-of 34 African and 19 Asian countries. We find that: (i) in addition to a State's water law, water allocation is also implicitly governed by contracts and international investment treaties; (ii) States de facto privatize water by allocating quasi-property rights through the granting of contracts to foreign international investors; (iii) such waters exploited by virtue of contracts reduce the ability of States to regulate water during the term of the contract especially as investors' water use is protected by bilateral investment treaties and potential compensation claims; and (iv) the need of the State to increasingly adaptively govern water as the impacts of climate change on water become more noticeable will be challenged by the long-term quasi property rights granted by States to investors in such contracts.

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